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Subjective well-being is no great issue in sociology; the subject is not mentioned in 
sociological textbooks (a notable exception is Nolan & Lenski, 2004) and is rarely discussed 
in sociological journals. This absence has many reasons: pragmatic, ideological, and 
theoretical. To begin with pragmatic reasons: Sociologists are more interested in what people 
do than in how they feel. Their main objective is to explain social behavior, and subjective 
well-being is, at best, a variable in that context. A related point is that sociology is about 
collectivities, whereas subjective well-being is an individual-level concept. A further 
pragmatic reason is that sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems. So, if 
they look at well-being at all, they focus on "ill-being" in the first place. Next there are ideo-
logical reasons. Many sociologists are committed to notions of objective well-being, such as 
social equality and social cohesion. They are therefore not eager to investigate how people 
actually feel in such conditions and often ignore research results that contradict their favored 
views. When people appear to feel subjectively good in conditions deemed to be objectively 
bad, the discrepancy is easily disposed of as "desirability bias" or "false consciousness." 
Lastly, there are theoretical reasons. As we will see below, sociologists tend to think of 
subjective well-being as a mere idea that depends on social comparison with variable 
standards and that is therefore a whimsical state of mind, not worth pursuing and hence not 
worth studying. 
Nevertheless, the subject of subjective well-being is not entirely absent in sociology. 
Job satisfaction is a common topic in the sociology of work, marital satisfaction is a well-
known variable in the sociology of family, and life satisfaction is a regular theme in the 
sociology of aging. Recently subjective well-being has also become a theme in comparative 
sociology and in social indicators research. I have reviewed this sociological literature 
elsewhere (Veenhoven, 2006a). 
Questions about Subjective Well-Being 
Theories are tentative answers to questions. In the case of subjective well-being, four main 
questions arc at stake. The first question is what subjective well-being is precisely, and, in 
particular, how we distinguish subjective well-being as such from its determinants. The 
second question—how people appraise how well they are—concerns the mental processes 
involved. The third question is about the conditions for subjective well-being and is closely 
linked to the question of how subjective well-being can be raised. Lastly a fourth question is 
about the consequences of subjective well-being, which links up to the ideological issue of 
whether subjective well-being should be raised. In this chapter I give an outline of how 
mainstream sociology has dealt with these four questions. 
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1.         QUESTION 1: WHAT IS "SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING"? 
 
In this chapter we follow Diener's definition of subjective well-being as judging life 
positively and feeling good: "Thus a person is said to have high [subjective well-being] if she 
or he experiences life satisfaction and frequent joy, and only infrequently experiences 
unpleasant emotions such as sadness or anger. Contrariwise, a person is said to have low 
[subjective well-being] if she or he is dissatisfied with life, experiences little joy and 
affection and frequently feels negative emotions such as anger or anxiety" (Diener, Suh, & 
Oishi, 1997, p. 25). 
My own definition of happiness is close to Diener et al.'s definition of subjective well-
being, and I also make a distinction between cognitive and affective appraisals of life. Yet I 
do not see life satisfaction as a mere cognitive appraisal but as an overall judgment of life 
that draws on two sources of information: cognitive comparison with standards of the good 
life (contentment) and affective information from how one feels most of the time (hedonic 
level of affect). In my language "overall happiness" is synonymous with life satisfaction and 
subjective well-being (Veenhoven, 1984) 
 
Most sociologists associate the term with a somewhat different matter. First, sociologists 
focus typically on problems. In sociology books words for subjective experiences denote 
negative states most of the time, such as anomie, alienation, deprivation, and subjective 
poverty. Second, sociological notions of subjective well-being are typically more specific 
and denote not only how well one feels but also about what. Anomie is discomfort about the 
moral climate, and in alienation is the feeling of being ruled by a system in which one does 
not take part (Beerling, 1978). This specificity is connected to still another difference: 
Sociological notions of subjective well-being are not only about how one feels about what, 
they are often also about why one feels so (i.e., the cause is part of the concept). Anomie is 
not seen as a mere state of mind, it is also believed to be a reaction to normative erosion in 
society. This way of thinking about subjective well-being is already visible in the work of 
Comte (1851-1854), the founding father of sociology. His notion of "bonheur" (happiness) 
denotes a state of intellectual enlightenment combined with sacral feelings of inclusion and 
consensus that result from social progress (Ple, 2000). 
This way of conceptualizing subjective well-being stems from rhetorical use of the 
concept; it serves to communicate that something is beneficial and for that reason that 
something is connected conceptually with good feelings. Obviously, this way of 
conceptualization makes less sense analytically; if we put presumed conditions for well-
being in one hat with experienced well-being, we will never be able to see what causes what. 
As a result, such concepts cannot be meaningfully applied in a utilitarian search for social 
conditions that produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Applied for that 
purpose, such concepts lead to circular reasoning. If, for example, we define subjective well-
being as the feeling of connectedness that accompanies social integration, social integration 
is, by definition, a condition for subjective well-being. Empirical research based on such 
concepts will do no more than echo prepossession. This is typically the case with the indexes 
of well-being that are commonly used in sociology. I have discussed this matter in more 
detail elsewhere (Veenhoven, 2000a). 
 
In Diener et al.'s definition, subjective well-being is seen as the product of an overall 
appraisal of life that balances the good and the bad. This conceptualization does not restrict 
itself to specific feelings and does not mix up the subjective experience with its possible 
causes. In the rest of this chapter I use the term subjective well-being in this sense. 
This concept of subjective well-being is close to Bentham's (1970) classic definition 
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of happiness as "the sum of pleasures and pains." Most sociologists know of this concept, but 
few have applied it, although it made a comeback in the 1960s in some pockets of sociology, 
in particular, in social indicators research and the sociology of aging. I was among the early 
re-adaptors (Veenhoven, 1968), but certainly not the first sociologist who harked back to 
Bentham; the first U.S. study on happiness in this sense had appeared in 1965 (Bradburn & 
Caplovitz, 1965), 
2. QUESTION 2: HOW DO WE APPRAISE HOW WELL WE ARE? 
Sticking to Diener et al.'s (1997) definition of subjective well-being as being satisfied with 
life and feeling good, the next question is how we determine this state. What is going on in 
the mind when we assess how much we enjoy life? This question is of more than mere 
academic interest, because the answer to it has implications for how we can advance 
subjective well-being (Question 3) and whether it is worth advancing (Question 4). 
Although sociologists are not specialized in matters of the mind, they still make 
psychological assumptions. They typically borrow from cognitive psychology, in which they 
find support for their view on humans as socially determined. In this line, sociologists see 
subjective well-being as a cognitive "construct" shaped by collective notions of the good life 
and as a result of comparisons, particularly social comparison. 
2.1     Presumed Social Construction of Subjective Well-Being 
Social construction theory discusses how we make sense of things. It assumes that we 
"construct" mental representations of reality, using collective notions as building blocks 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966). Social constructionism stresses human thinking and is blind to 
affective experience and innate drives. 
In this view, subjective well-being is also a social construction and, as such, 
comparable to notions such as "beauty" and "fairness." A common reasoning in this line is 
that subjective well-being depends on shared notions about life and that these collective 
notions frame individual appraisals. 
One of the ways this process is presumed to work is by shaping perspectives toward 
optimism (the glass half full) or pessimism (half empty). Optimistic cultures tend to highlight 
the positive aspects of life, whereas pessimistic cultures emphasize the shortcomings. 
Americans have been mentioned as an example of the former view and the French of the 
latter (e.g., Ostroot & Snyder [1985]). In that line Inglehart (1990) suggests that happiness is 
lower in France than in the United States because life was harder in France for earlier 
generations, and this experience is mirrored in a more pessimistic outlook on life today. 
Another cognitive mechanism presumed to be involved is comparison with shared 
notions of the good life. In this view, subjective well-being is the gap between perceptions of 
life-as-it-is with notions of how-life-should-be (Michalos, 1985). In this line it is commonly 
argued that the advertisement industry reduces our well-being, because it fosters dreams of a 
life that is out of reach for the common person. Another example of this view is the claim 
that subjective well-being can be bought with resignation. 
 An additional mechanism that has been mentioned is the tendency to see ourselves 
though the eyes of others and hence also our subjective well-being. In this view, subjective 
well-being is a "reflected appraisal," We would be positive about our life when people 
around us deem us to be well off and negative when others see us as a looser. In this vein the 
lower happiness among singles has been explained as the result of a negative stereotype: 
Because singles are "labeled" as pitiful, they come to see themselves as miserable, in spite of 
the apparent advantages of single living (e,g., Davies & Strong, 1977). 
The constructionist view implies that there is little value to subjective well-being because
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it is a mere idea. In addition, because notions about the good life vary across time and 
culture, subjective well-being is also seen to be culturally relative. A life that is deemed 
perfect in one idea of the good life may be seen as a failure from another point of view. For 
this reason this theory is popular among the critics of the utilitarian creed that we should aim 
at "greater happiness for a greater number"; it reduces happiness to something insignificant. 
2.1.1  Theoretical Plausibility 
It is beyond doubt that shared notions frame much of our appraisals, yet this is not to say that 
all awareness is socially constructed. We need no shared notions to experience pain or 
hunger; culture, at best, modifies our reflection on these experiences a bit. Our understanding 
also draws on external stimuli and inner signals. The question is thus how this process works 
in the case of subjective well-being. 
The answer to that question depends on the definition of subjective well-being. If the 
term is defined as the mere belief that one's life fits the common Standards for a good life, 
social construction is evidently involved. However, if the definition also involves affective 
experience, this is not so evident. In this chapter we follow Diener et al.'s (1997) definition of 
subjective well-being, and that definition involves a preponderance of positive affect over 
negative affect. 
Affect and cognition are linked, but they are certainly not the same. Evaluations of 
life draw on both sources of information, and affective appraisals dominate. When striking 
the balance of their life, people appear to use their mood as the prime source of information 
(Schwartz & Strack, 1991), and consequently overall happiness typically correlates more 
strongly with hedonic levels of affect than with contentment (Veenhoven, 2006c, H61). There 
is logic in this thinking, because the affect system is evolutionary older and serves to 
ascertain that the organism's basic needs are met. The cognitive system developed on top of 
this in Homo sapiens, but it did not replace the affective system. It is rather an additional 
device that allows planning of activities and better learning from experience. In that light it is 
unlikely that subjective well-being is a mere cognition. 
2.1.2  Empirical Support 
The reality value of this view cannot be tested as such, because the human mind is still a 
black box. Yet we can check its aptness indirectly, when we consider implications of the 
theory that subjective well-being is a mere social construction. 
Culture Specific?  
One implication is that conditions for subjective well-being are variable across cultures. If 
subjective well-being is a culture-specific construct, its determinants will also be culturally 
specific. Hence empirical studies on correlates of subjective well-being must show 
considerable cultural variation and hardly any universal pattern. Yet the available data show 
otherwise. Comparison of average subjective well-being across nations reveals a common 
pattern. Subjective well-being is systematically higher in nations that provide a decent mate-
rial standard of living, that are politically democratic and well governed, and where the 
cultural climate is characterized by trust and tolerance. Together these objective societal 
characteristics explain about 75% of the differences in subjective well-being across nations 
(Veenhoven & Kalmijn, 2005). Comparison of correlations within nations also shows much 
similarity. In all countries, the married appear to be happier than singles (Diener, 2000), and 
health (both physical health and mental) is also a strong correlate of happiness all over the 
world (Veenhoven, 2006c, P6, M71). Likewise, the differences in happiness across age and 
gender are typically small everywhere (Veenhoven, 2006c, A4, G1). 
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Variable over Time?  
A second implication is that subjective well-being must be variable across time. If subjective 
well-being depends on shared notions of the good life, it will vary with fads about that 
matter, and this variation must reflect erratic movements in average subjective well-being in 
nations, comparable to changes in political preference and tastes for music. Yet again this 
not what the data show. Average subjective well-being appears to be very stable over time, 
at least in Western nations over the last 30 years, where happiness rose slightly without 
much fluctuation (Veenhoven, 2006b). Follow-up studies at the individual level also show 
considerable constancy over time (Ehrhardt, Saris, & Veenhoven, 2000). 
Inconsequential?  
A third implication is that subjective well-being is of little consequence. If subjective well-
being is sheer cognitive spin, based on fashionable ideas, it will not matter much whether it 
pans out positively or negatively. Subjective well-being is then a petty appraisal, such as a 
person's preference for one kind of wallpaper or another; nice in itself but of no consequence 
for anything more than that. 
Once more, this appears not to be the case. Subjective well-being goes hand in hand 
with objective thriving. Furthermore, follow-up studies have shown that subjective well-
being is a strong predictor of physical health and longevity (e.g., Danner, Friesen, & 
Snowdow, 2001). Together, these findings do not support the theory that subjective well-
being is a mere making of the mind. 
Note that these findings concern "subjective well-being-as-such" and not opinions 
about what adds to subjective well-being. Subjective well-being-as-such is something that we 
experience ourselves and which we can appraise without the help of others. Though we know 
how we feel, we often do not know why. In attributing grounds for our well-being, we draw 
more on a shared view. In this respect subjective well-being is comparable to a headache: a 
headache-as-such is not a social construction, it is an autonomous signal from the body. Yet 
our interpretations of what gives us a headache depend very much on hearsay. 
2.2     Well-Being as Surpassing the Joneses 
All sociologists learned in their student days about the exemplary case of "relative 
deprivation," described in Stouffer's (1949) classic study "The American Soldier." One of the 
areas assessed in this study was the satisfaction with promotion chances. Contrary to 
expectation, the satisfaction with this aspect of Army life appeared to be higher in units 
where promotion chances were low, such as the military police, than in units where 
promotion chances were high, such as the Air Force. This phenomenon was explained in 
terms of social comparison; because promotion was more common in the Air Force, Air 
Force personnel more often felt entitled to promotion. This case of satisfaction with 
promotion makes many sociologists think that all satisfaction depends on social comparison 
and thus also life satisfaction. 
Social comparison theory (see Fujita, Chapter 12, this volume) is a variant of a wider 
comparison theory that links up with the above-mentioned notion that subjective well-being 
is the difference between life-as-it-is and how-life-should-be. The smaller these 
discrepancies are, the higher the subjective well-being is assumed to be. In this theory there 
can be multiple discrepancies; among other things, discrepancies between what one has and 
what one thinks that one could have, and discrepancies between what one has and what one 
feels entitled to (Michalos, 1985). Perceptions of what one could have and what would be 
fair to have are seen to draw on social comparison. In this view, subjective well-being is a 
matter of keeping up with the Joneses; we feel well if we do better and bad if we do worse. 
In this theory there is little hope for achieving greater happiness for a greater number, 
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because improving the living conditions for all will also improve the life of the Joneses, 
leaving the relative differences what they are. Social comparison is one of the mechanisms in 
the idea that we are on a "hedonic treadmill" that presumably nullifies all progress (Brickman 
& Campbell, 1971), and it is the main mechanism in Easterlin's (1974) theory that economic 
growth does not add to subjective well-being. In this view we can, at best, mitigate the 
effects of social comparison somewhat if we make the differences less visible. In this line 
Frank (1999) has advised that conspicuous consumption should be discouraged with heavy 
taxes on luxury goods. Limiting advertisement is also suggested in this context, in particular, 
commercials that use pictures of a life that is out of reach for the common person (Layard, 
2005). 
 
2.2.1  Theoretical Plausibility 
There are several problems with this theory. First of all it is clear that social comparison does 
not apply to all subjective appraisal. When I hit my finger with a hammer, I feel pain—and it 
does not hurt less if neighbor Jones does the same. When appraising our situation, we use 
various sources of information, and social comparison is only one of these. 
This point brings us to the question of what value social comparison provides for 
assessing how well one lives. Obviously, that value is limited to aspects of life in which 
social comparison is possible, such as your income. Social comparison is not so relevant for 
evaluating the less visible aspects of life, such as your sex life or the pleasure you take from 
watching the sunset. Where comparison with the Joneses is practicable, it informs us about 
what is possible in life but not necessarily about what is desirable or enjoyable. Looking over 
the fence of my neighbor, I can see that I lag behind in the number of beer cans emptied, but 
this does not tell me whether I would be better off if I drank more. Advocates of social 
comparison theory would retort that we compare only in areas that are socially valued in 
society, such as money and fame, and this reality links up with the assumption that notions of 
the good life are socially constructed. Yet even if beer boozing were highly valued in my 
society, and if I wholeheartedly supported that value, I would end up less well if I drank 
more than my dipsomaniacal neighbor. That is evident because drinking too much is bad for 
the body, irrespective of how I think about it. This example illustrates a major flaw in 
comparison theory: It forgets that we are biological organisms. 
Obviously we cannot feel well if our body is harmed. Affective alarms start ringing 
when we do not get enough food or when our temperature falls too low. Less obvious but no 
less existent are psychological needs, such as the need to belong and to use and develop our 
potentials. We feel lousy when lonely and bored when unchallenged. Humans are not born as 
a tabula rasa, on which socialization imprints culture-specific wants; we are prewired to need 
some things and as a result feel good when these needs are met. 
In this respect we are very much like our fellow animals. Dogs and cats can also feel 
good or bad and evidently do not calculate their subjective well-being by comparing shared 
standards of the good life. Evolution has simply programmed them to feel good or bad 
subjectively in situations that are good or bad for their survival objectively. Our affective 
system is not much different from that of dogs and cats, and also serves to make us do 
intuitively what is good for us. Human cognition has developed on top of this affective 
program and allows us to reflect on affective signals and even to ignore them to some extent. 
Yet this is not to say that cognition has replaced affective experience. Without affective 
information we are conatively blind; we cannot choose and cannot come to an overall 
judgment (Damasio, 1994). 
I have discussed this alternative "need theory" of happiness elsewhere (Veenhoven, 
1995, 2000a). This theory is also called "livability theory," and in this case the emphasis is 
on the conditions that allow for need gratification. Together with Lucas, Diener has reviewed 
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the strong and weak points of this theory (Diener & Lucas, 2000). Though alien to 
mainstream sociology', this latter view on subjective well-being would fit sociobiology; to 
my knowledge this field of sociology has not yet considered the issue. 
 
2.2.2  Fit with Facts 
Social comparison is at best one piece of information in appraisals of subjective well-being, 
and it is an empirical question to determine how much it matters. We can see how much 
when considering some implications of the theory. One testable implication of social 
comparison theory is that people typically are neither positive nor negative about their life. If 
we feel good because we do better than the Joneses, then the Joneses must feel bad because 
they do worse. This trend must manifest in an average around neutral in general population 
samples. Yet survey data do not support this prediction; average subjective well-being is far 
above neutral in modern nations. 
Another implication is that subjective well-being must be higher among people who 
do well on socially valued standards. This is not always the case, however. Though people in 
high-status jobs are typically happier than people in low-status occupations (Veenhoven, 
2006c: O1), there is no correlation between subjective well-being and level of education 
(Veenhoven, 2006c. El). Likewise, there is only modest correlation between subjective well-
being and income, and this correlation is at least partly due to an effect of the former on the 
latter, happiness adding to earning chances (Veenhoven, 2006c I1) However, subjective well-
being does appear to depend on things that have little to do with social comparison, as we 
will see below. 
 
 
3.  QUESTION 3: WHAT CONDITIONS FOSTER SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING? 
 
Dealing with this question, sociologists first look at social conditions. At the macro level 
they look at characteristics of society, such as industrialization and individualization, and 
take particular interest in variations in state organization, such as welfare state regimes. 
Looking at conditions for happiness within societies, sociologists look at people's position on 
the social ladder, at their participation in public institutions, and at their embedding in private 
networks. 
 
3.1   Modernity 
Sociology developed in the turmoil of transition from an agrarian to an industrial society and 
this has focused attention on problems of modernization. Sociologists conducted incisive 
studies about the agonies of working-class people in the early phase of industrialization, 
about discrimination of migrants and the perils of life in growing cities. There are also 
insightful accounts of moral disorganization and the decline of the family. This research on 
modern misery has fueled the idea that life was better in the "good old days." Every year I 
ask my sociology students whether they think that modernization has made society more 
livable, and invariably the majority thinks that this is not the case, 
A common theory behind this idea of withering well-being is that we humans are 
prewired for strong social networks, such as small communities, close-knit families, and a 
united church. Many sociologists were raised with Tönnies's (1979) distinction between 
traditional " Gemeinschaft" and modern " Gesellschaft" and heard their professors tell them 
that the former is more livable than the latter (though Tönnies himself saw the development 
to Gesellschaft as an improvement). Hence it is no surprise to find sociologists at the head of 
the communitarian movement that aims to "bring community back in society" (Etzioni, 
1993). 
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Are we really prewired for a life in "strong" social networks? The pattern of cohesive 
communities, extended families, and a strong church is characteristic of agrarian societies but 
not of the hunter-gatherer society from which the human species has evolved. Hunter-
gatherer societies are rather characterized by "weak" social ties, shifting bands being 
common in such societies, as is serial monogamy. Exertion of power is limited in hunter-
gatherer existence, and social relations are therefore largely based on exchange and 
attraction. Seen in this light, modern individualized Gesellschaft may fit human nature better 
than traditional collectivist Gemeinschaft. Maryanski and Turner (1992) make this point 
convincingly in their seminal study The Social Cage, which documents the human preference 
for weak ties with findings from anthropology and ethnology. They show how the agrarian 
revolution forced humans into an oppressing social system (the social cage) and explain why 
people massively turned their back on pastoral Gemeinschaft once the industrial revolution 
provided a way out. 
We cannot assess the subjective well-being of our ancestors, but anthropological 
archeology has found indications of their physical condition. Longevity appears not to have 
risen after the agrarian revolution, whereas health deteriorated (Sanderson, 1995). This shift 
marks a quality dip in human history. As we all know, the industrial revolution has been 
followed by an unprecedented rise in longevity that still goes on today and that also involves 
a steady rise in the number of years lived in good health. Less well known is the fact that 
subjective well-being has also risen. This rise appears in the comparison of more and less 
modern nations at the present time and also is the trend in modern nations over the last 40 
years (Veenhoven, 2005a, 2006b). 
So there is truth in the notion that societal development may go against human nature 
and reduce subjective well-being. Yet, contrary to what most sociologists believe, this 
reduction happened not after the industrial revolution, but thousands of years earlier in the 
wake of the agrarian revolution. In contrast, modernization appears to have boosted 
subjective well-being. 
 
  3.2 Welfare State 
Many sociologists work for institutions of the welfare state. This context fosters a tendency 
among sociologists to equate public welfare with well-being. In The Netherlands they even 
denote these two concepts with the same word (welzijn). In this line it is assumed that 
subjective well-being is higher in extended welfare states such as Sweden than in residual 
welfare states such as the United States, and that this status is believed to be particularly true 
for "vulnerable" people, such as the aged and unemployed. This theory is not unchallenged, 
however; for instance, Murray (1984) argues that lavish welfare is inefficient and causes 
people to go "from the frying pan into the fire". 
Empirical research shows no higher subjective well-being in welfare states than in 
otherwise comparable nations where "Father State" is less open-handed. Surprisingly there is 
also no difference in inequality of subjective well-being, as measured using the standard 
deviation of happiness. This absence of a difference appears both in a comparison of nations 
in the early 1990s and in a comparison over time within nations (Veenhoven, 2000b). An 
analysis that focused on the unemployed, in particular, yielded the same result (Ouweneel, 
2000). These findings may mean that there is some truth in both theoretical positions and that 
the positive and negative effects of state welfare balance out. 
 
 
3.3  Social Inequality 
The development of sociology was also influenced by the emancipation movements of the 
20th century, first of laborers and then of women and ethnic minorities. Though these 
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movements have been successful to a great extent, inequality is a still the main issue in 
sociology. In this line, sociologists tend to think of subjective well-being in terms of 
inequality; people who feel bad are assumed to be deprived in some way, and people who are 
deemed to be deprived are assumed to feel bad. 
Social inequality is commonly defined as differential "access to scarce resources," 
and the resources typically mentioned in social textbooks are income, power, and prestige. 
Income differences are most prominent in the discourse on social inequality, in particular, 
differences at the bottom of the income distribution. The tradition of poverty research in 
sociology stresses the adverse effects of income inequality on well-being and warns of a 
growing split in society between haves and have-nots. 
It is evident that social inequality can reduce subjective well-being, particularly of the 
deprived. Yet it is not so evident that all inequalities do and that income inequality is a main 
thread to subjective well-being in modern society. Cocaine is a scarce resource in most 
Western nations, and there are clear differences in access to it, but people who can easily get 
cocaine do not stand out as having greater subjective well-being. Not everything that is 
scarce is beneficial; a point that may also apply to socially valued luxury goods such as big 
cars, second houses, and fancy holidays. Remember the above discussion on social compari-
son. It seems more plausible that inequality hurts only when it interferes with the 
gratification of basic needs, such as our need for food or respect. 
The first sociological surveys on subjective well-being were conducted in the context 
of marketing research for the welfare state and were expected to show suffering among the 
deprived. However, this finding failed to appear in the data. As mentioned above, subjective 
well-being is only marginally related to socioeconomic position in modern nations. 
Subjective well-being is more strongly related to socioemotional position, that is, ties with 
friends, family, and clubs. Yet these are not "scarce resources," of which only limited 
amounts are available. 
Another surprise is that there is no correlation between the degree of income 
inequality in nations and average subjective well-being (Berg, 2006). Apparently, we can 
live with big disparities in income. This accommodation does not mean that we can live 
equally well with all forms of inequality; for example, gender inequality in nations does go 
with lower average well-being. In this case it is not only the women who suffer, men are also 
less happy in gender-segregated nations (Chin Hon Foei, 2006). 
Still another unexpected outcome is that inequality in happiness, as measured with 
the standard deviation, appears to have decreased in modern nations over the last 40 years 
(Veenhoven, 2005c). That finding is in flat contradiction with the sociological theory of the 
"new inequality" rising in modern society. 
 
3.4  Social Participation 
Sociologists are also concerned about the involvement of individuals in society. Many 
sociologists work for organizations that try to engage people in their communities and the 
political process. Though this work is done for the benefit of institutions in the first place, it 
is generally believed that individual citizens also profit from social participation (e.g., 
Putnam, 2000); remember the above-noted tendency of sociologists to put different varieties 
of the good in one hat. Several mechanisms have been mentioned in this context; one is that 
social participation creates "social capital" that can be used to "produce" subjective well-
being. Another presumed mechanism is that social participation is rewarding in itself, not 
only because it involves rewarding contacts with other people, but also because it fosters a 
sense of having control and being part of society. 
Sociological intuition fits the data better in this case. Comparative studies at the 
nation level show higher subjective well-being in nations with a well-functioning democracy 
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and dense networks of voluntary associations (Veenhoven, 2004). Studies among individuals 
in nations show invariably that active members of clubs and churches report greater 
subjective well-being than nonmembers or passive members (Veenhoven, 2006c: S6-8). 
Unfortunately, the available data do not give us information about cause and effect, so the 
correlation could be due largely to effects of happiness, which would fit Fredrickson's (2004) 
"broaden and build" theory. 
This is not to say that more participation is always better and certainly not that 
participation in the public sphere is most conducive to subjective well-being. We see this 
point in the case of work life. Paid work is often praised as required for subjective well-
being, but the data show that many can live without paid work. For example, retirement does 
not seem to reduce subjective well-being (Veenhoven, 2006c: R2), and full-time 
homemakers have been found to be happier than working mothers (Veenhoven, 2006c: 
E2.2.1). Only among male breadwinners are the employed at an advantage (Veenhoven, 
2006c: E2). Still another point to note in this context is that subjective well-being appears to 
be lowest in the phase of life where participation in public life is highest. Comparison of 
subjective well-being across age groups reveals a U-shaped pattern of people feeling best in 
their early 20s and after age 50, and worst in the midyears of life when they are most 
involved in work. 
 
3.5  Social Support 
Though private life is not the prime domain of Western sociology, there is a long tradition of 
research into family ties and a more recent body of research on friendship. Subjective well-
being is a common theme in this context. It is generally assumed that we need such 
"primary" ties and that subjective well-being depends on the availability and quality of the 
ties. Again, several causal mechanisms have been hypothesized to be involved. One of these 
is that intimates "support" us materially and immaterially (e.g., Putnam, 2000) Among the 
immaterial kinds of support are information, emotional backing, and behavioral correction. 
Another theory holds that family relations protect against negative labeling as a deviant. 
Empirical research has indeed shown strong relations between intimate ties and 
subjective well-being, and in this case there is also evidence for causal effects of the former 
on the latter (e.g., Lucas, Clark, Diener, & Georgellis, 2003). The causal mechanism seems 
to be social support rather than protection against negative stereotyping (Veenhoven, 1989), 
a finding that is still another indication that cognitive theories of subjective well-being fall 
short. 
 
 
4. QUESTION 4: WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEELING WELL OR NOT? 
 
Research on subjective well-being has focused on its determinants in search of an answer to 
the question of how it can be advanced. Another issue is the consequences of subjective well-
being, which is relevant to answering the question of whether subjective well-being should 
be furthered. 
This is a topic in the psychology of subjective well-being and, in particular, in the 
recent field of positive psychology. Together with Lyubomirsky, Diener has published a 
review of the literature that shows positive effects on various aspects of human functioning, 
such as creativity, social contacts, work performance, and physical health (Lyubomirsky, 
King, & Diener, 2005). The data fit well with the above-mentioned theory that subjective 
well-being "broadens" and "builds" (Fredrickson, 2004); broadening means that subjective 
well-being widens our perceptual horizon, and building means that it facilitates the formation 
of resources. 
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Sociologists have not given much thought on this topic as yet, and mainstream 
opinion is still largely guided by the tale of the Brave New World (Huxley, 1932), in which 
subjective well-being goes hand in hand with superficial consumerism, political apathy, and 
general ignorance. That story fits the theory that subjective well-being is a mere cognitive 
illusion that does not root in real quality of life. Sociologists see typically more value in 
discontent, which they regard as the seed of personal motivation and social change. 
 
 
 
5. IS SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING A SUBJECT FOR SOCIOLOGY? 
 
Some of my colleague sociologists feel that the subject of subjective well-being should be 
left to psychology, because it is a mental state and not a condition of society. I think they are 
wrong. 
One reason is that the subjective well-being of individuals entails important 
information about the quality of the social system in which they live. If people typically feel 
bad, the social system is apparently not well suited for human habitation. One of the aims of 
sociology is to contribute to a better society, and the study of subjective well-being provides 
clues for a more livable society (Veenhoven 2004). This inductive approach to the good 
society is also a counterpoise to the speculative theorizing about the good society and an 
antidote against the ideological prepossessions on that matter. There is a rising demand for 
information about social conditions that foster subjective well-being among policymakers 
because, among other reasons, the great ideologies have lost appeal. 
Another reason why sociologists should be more concerned about subjective well-
being is that it is one of the determinants of social behavior. Most sociologists would be 
surprised to learn that happy people are typically better citizens, that they are better informed 
about political matters, that they use their voting rights more often, that they involve 
themselves more in civil action and are, at the same time, less radical in their political views 
(Lyubomirsky & Diener 2005). Clearly, these attributes are relevant for understanding the 
functioning of the democratic system. Subjective well-being is also likely to affect the 
functioning of other social systems, such as work organizations and friendship networks. 
So, individual subjective wellbeing is both an outcome social systems and a factor in their 
functioning. As such the subject belongs to the core business of sociology. 
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NOTES 
1 The collection of "Correlational Findings" in the World Database of Happiness is sorted by subject. Subject   
sections ate indicated with a capital letter and a number; for example, A4 for findings on happiness and Age, 
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